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Abstract: Indonesia committed to conserving the tuna resources by participating in some RFMOs. From all 
regional organizations where Indonesia has been joined, the CCSBT is the unique one, due to it governs a 
single tuna species, which is called Southern Bluefin Tuna. This kind of tuna is essential for Indonesia 
because it is the world’s most expensive tuna and SBT migrates through Indonesian fisheries 
management zones and goes even further within the territorial waters, where the SBT spawning area is 
located. This natural characteristic distinguishes Indonesia from other Parties to CCSBT. Nevertheless, the 
Country has been dealing with its obligation to comply with national quota allocation. For some fishing 
season periods, the CCSBT indicated Indonesia as a non-compliant. By applying the qualitative approach, 
this study considers how Indonesia’s non-compliance has been addressed in fishing for shared fish stocks. 
The data collection was conducted through semi-structured interviews and legal analysis of law and 
policy instruments. This method leads the elaboration to reveal domestic factors affecting non-
compliance by Indonesia. This study argues, the fisheries legislation should consider the provision 
concerning fishing for resources under quota system, hence, it will provide sufficient legal base to take 
enforcement measures towards non-compliance with fishing quota.  





The non-compliance of international law costs two primary concerns. First, once the 
international legal obligation has been violated, that breach can shrink the authority of 
the obligation itself. Despite the lack of concern of the breaching State, however, it will 
be a concern to others or non-breaching States that rely upon the obligation breached, 
regardless of whether they do not immediately harm the particular breach at issue. 
Further, non-compliance action can obstruct the establishment of the international rule 
of law, as well as the maintenance of a habit of obedience. The habits of observing and 
accepting the law will make international order in stability. Therefore, any breach of an 
international obligation can weaken the authority of the rule breached and also the 
integrity of the international legal system. Considering that the stability of the 
international system as a whole is influenced by compliance action, consequently, all 
States, despite States which are not joining as party to the international agreement, 
might have an interest in compliance.1  
 
1 Cogan, J. K. (2006). Noncompliance and the international rule of law. Yale J. Int'l L., 31, 189. 
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Compliance's member is used as a criterion in determining fishing quota for 
international shared-fish stock allocated by Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization (RFMO). When over-quota has been identified, the corrective measure will 
be considered by RFMO towards the non-compliant member. The Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) is one of the fishery organizations that 
apply quota reductions with regards to over-quota.2 In the Corrective Actions Policy, 
when the catch is more than the member's annual quota, the member is required to do 
quota payback. Otherwise, there will be two situations enforced as follows: 
Member shall not apply the carry-forward procedures provided in CCSBT's 
Resolution on Limited Carry-forward of Unfished Annual Total Available Catch 
of Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) until those catches have been paid back unless 
otherwise agreed by the Extended Commission, and the Member is not eligible 
for an increase in its effective catch limit
 
until the excess catch has been paid 
back unless otherwise agreed by the Extended Commission. 
With high repetition on exceeding the national quota, the Country’s fishing vessel could 
possibly be considered as non-compliance if there is no actions taken by the 
government to improve the control and monitoring towards vessels flying its flag.3 
When the Country is indicated as non-compliant with fishing quota, it will impact to the 
Country’s reputation in international fisheries, moreover, there will be possibility that 
the Country will be imposed for a reduction in its quota allocation. Therefore, non-
compliance is one of the most significant threats facing good fisheries governance and 
conservation attempts today. The enforcement of compliance with management 
measures of RFMOs is pivotal to ensuring that these organizations fulfil the role 
envisaged for them under international law.4  
Being experienced with over-catch of SBT quota for some fishing season, it can be 
assumed that Indonesia is seriously undermining the combined efforts of other CCSBT 
Member governments to rebuild stocks of SBT which has been in a perilous situation. 
Since ratified and participated in international agreements, Indonesia is subject to its 
commitment to adopting international provisions into national legislation. While tuna 
RFMOs can be seen as suitable one to manage resources, in fact international 
frameworks are likely lack of power on its compulsory jurisdiction when it comes to 
transboundary fisheries. The legal consequences of a violation as well as the possible 
redress mechanisms need to be clearly settled due to the migratory nature of SBT.5  
Martin Tsamenyi and Quentin Hanich added that a major gap in international 
framework was the lack of compatibility between the regimes of the high seas and 
Exclusive Economic Zones. No international legal instruments address fisheries 
 
2 Cox, A. (2009). Quota allocation in international fisheries. OECD Food, Agric. Fish. Pap., no. 22, pp. 
161. 
3 Miller, D. D., & Sumaila, U. R. (2014). Flag use behavior and IUU activity within the international 
fishing fleet: Refining definitions and identifying areas of concern. Marine Policy, 44, 210. 
4 Clark, E. A. (2011). Compliance enforcement in regional fisheries management organizations to 
which Australia is a party (Doctoral dissertation, University of Tasmania). 38. 
5 Southern Bluefin Tuna-Species Impact Statement. (2009). available online from 
https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0004/508018/southern_bluefin_tuna_sis_part_1.pdf  
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jurisdiction in maritime zones under the sovereignty of coastal States. There would be a 
risk to the effective action across the range of the stock if large areas under coastal 
State sovereignty are excluded from any measurement adopted by RFMOs. Hence, the 
fisheries governance framework is almost entirely at the discretion of the coastal State.6 
Being such precious fish, SBT has been indicated as critically endangered. Over-fishing 
and catching SBT exceeds than allocated quota are two crucial challenges in achieving 
the sustainable objective.7 Moreover, in the field of fisheries conservation, emphasis 
has been placed by quantitative analyses in the context of how to do stock 
enhancement.8 This type of analyses has not captured the wider impacts of the 
conservation. Science is indeed the basic to make decisions about what to do with our 
natural resources, however it should also be based on other aspects such as politic, 
economic, and cultural considerations. While questioning the way to integrate those 
diverse perspectives to create policy outcomes, a qualitative social approach is an 
interconnected way of different types of knowledge and comprehend them in a more 
effective marine resources governance.9 
This study argues that without adequate law enforcement, the quota allocation system 
does not contribute to SBT sustainability. Furthermore, international law instruments 
for conservation measures will never be worked in driving any State to comply unless 
the national laws of each member States support to do so. This study critically identifies 
non-compliance issues in fishing for international shared-fish stock which Indonesia has 
been dealing with and examines to what extend domestic factors affecting Indonesia’s 
compliance with international provisions. In this light, this study contributes to provoke 
the needs to include the legal provision concerning fisheries under quota management 
into national legislation.  
 
2. Method 
The study applies a qualitative approach and uses content analysis to construct the 
main problem's argument. A qualitative method of this study can help to take an 
essence of social legal evaluation of marine resource use and conservation. As 
Levontin10 described that “connected knowledge that qualitative social science can 
produce, it is possible to understand more about what the likely consequences of 
 
6 Tsamenyi, M., & Hanich, Q. (2012). Fisheries jurisdiction under the Law of the Sea Convention: rights 
and obligations in maritime zones under the sovereignty of Coastal States. The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law, 27(4),792. 
7 McIntyre, P. B., Reidy Liermann, C., Childress, E., Hamann, E. J., Hogan, J. D., Januchowski-Hartley, S. 
R., ... & Pracheil, B. M. (2016). Conservation of migratory fishes in freshwater ecosystems (pp. 324-360). 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
8 Bell, J. D., Leber, K. M., Blankenship, H. L., Loneragan, N. R., & Masuda, R. (2008). A new era for 
restocking, stock enhancement and sea ranching of coastal fisheries resources. Reviews in fisheries 
science, 16(1-3), 1-9. 
9 Jentoft, S. (2006). Beyond fisheries management: The Phronetic dimension. Marine Policy, 30(6), 
671-680. 
10 Levontin, P., Kulmala, S., Haapasaari, P., & Kuikka, S. (2011). Integration of biological, economic, and 
sociological knowledge by Bayesian belief networks: the interdisciplinary evaluation of potential 
management plans for Baltic salmon. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 68(3), 632-638. 
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policies before they are implemented”.  
The data collection was carried out in two ways. First, semi-structured interviews and 
analyzing relevant law instruments. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
some key informants who doing responsibility in managing the fishing quota in 
Indonesia. Several respondents have never been specific in qualitative research.11 
However, the respondents were selected following their significant responsibility. The 
main interview was conducted through confirmation to some figures from the Ministry 
of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, having their role as Indonesia representative who 
participated in the CCSBT annual meeting. An interview was held with a Tuna 
Association member to get more knowledge concerning the real problem and practical 
matter. In addition, the discussion was carried with the compliance manager of CCSBT 
to obtain confirmation regarding compliance policy and particular action plans during 
the pandemics. Second, relevant data were obtained by studying the law instrument 
and regulations and documentary materials, including the official report by Regional 
Fisheries Management Organization, particularly the CCSBT. 
 
3. The Non-Compliance Issue 
The purpose of fishing quota regulation is a limitation of fishery exploitation, especially 
for international or shared fish stocks.12 To get access to international fisheries, it is 
mandatory between coastal States and flag States who fish in the region, as mentioned 
in Articles 63(2) and 64 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), to cooperate through RFMOs to ensure the conservation goal of fish stocks. 
Further, the cooperation should encourage the optimum utilization of the stocks, either 
within or beyond the Exclusive Economic Zones of a State.  
The conservation and management measures provided in CCSBT provision indicates 
that members will report any fishing violation and take measures to ensure their 
flagged vessels meet the compliance. There are three sources which member States 
could be considered as non-compliance:13 
“(i) administrative failings, including not fully implementing effective systems 
and processes to support obligations; (ii) failure by Members to take action 
against non-compliance by fishers, farmers, processors, exporters or 
importers within their jurisdiction, and (iii) deliberate actions by Members to 
avoid meeting obligations.”   
The first element of Annex I of Minimum Performance Requirements to meet CCSBT 
Obligations sets out obligations relating to compliance with national quota allocations. 
Member State shall ensure that its total attributable SBT catch for a quota year shall not 
exceed its TAC. 
 
11 Al amaren, E. M., M. Z. bin M. Nor, and C. T. B. M. Ismail. (2020). Risks and Remedy in Islamic and 
Conventional Letter of Credit: Jordanian Practices," Int. J. Islam. Econ., vol. 2, no. 01, 54. 
12 Hatcher, A., & Pascoe, S. (2006). Non-compliance and fisheries policy formulation. In Developments 
in aquaculture and fisheries science (Vol. 36, pp. 355-373). Elsevier. 
13 CCSBT. Corrective Actions Policy, Compliance Policy Guideline 3. (2018). updated at the Twenty-
Fifth Annual Meeting 
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SBT quota in Indonesia is allocated for association namely Indonesia Tuna Association 
(ASTUIN) and Indonesia Tuna Long-line Association (ATLI). Each association will get 50% 
catch allocation of Indonesia annual catch quota. In 2010, the Integrated Fishing 
Fisheries Association (ASPERTADU) was formed in which the association only gets quota 
allocations from associations whose catch is less than the specified quota.14 The quota 
distribution refers to the Decision of Director General of Capture Fishery No. 75/KEP-
DJPT/2014 regarding the Technical Guidelines for the Distributions of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Quota Allocations. 
 
3.1. Over-catch  
According to the Indonesia Annual Report to the Compliance Committee and the 
Extended Commission CCSBT, Indonesia have encountered over-catch problem on SBT 
quota15 since 2011 until 2014. In the latest progress, the over-catch has been occurred 
again in 2019-2020 fishing season as shown in the Table 1. 






Total SBT Catch 
Counted against the 
National Allocation 
(ton) 
Causes for over-catch 
2011 651 843 
due to capacity building and a wide range of 
vessels size in the artisanal fisheries 
2012 685 910 
the existence of artisanal or small-scale 
fisheries  
2013 709 1383 
There is no SBT quota for vessels artisanal 
vessels. The reason is that the national quota is 
considered too small compared to the number 
of vessels involved. Meanwhile, there is a need 
to accommodate their right and interest  
2014 750 1063 
(a) SBT is considered as by-catch or un-intended 
catch to artisanal vessels, (b) a huge number of 
fleets with a wide- range of size involved, (c) a 
lot of people depend on their life on tuna 
fisheries, including SBT 
2019 1024 1206 
the COVID-19 pandemic that had a great impact 
on the economy, the fisheries sector in 
Indonesia changes its strategy to operate 
almost their entire fleet and increasing 
operation days.  
Source: Annual Report CCSBT, 2011-2020 (edited). 
 
14 Interview with the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs of Indonesia in Jakarta on 3 February 
2020 
15 SBT quota is allocated for association namely Indonesia Tuna Association (ASTUIN) and Indonesia 
Tuna Long-line Association (ATLI). Each association will get 50% catch allocation of Indonesia annual catch 
quota. 
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The background of Indonesia exceeded SBT quota was revealed in the Report of the 
Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Commission which Indonesia have been facing the 
difficulties in handling SBT catches due to the involvement of hundreds of small-scale 
tuna long-line vessels that SBT is not their main target. The explanation delivered by 
Indonesia representative as stated as follows:16 
“But after implementing the quota approach within 5 (five) years, we have had 
some difficulties controlling the annual catch limit based on the current 
reserved quota, due to the existence of artisanal tuna long-liner or small-scale 
fisheries, that are mainly fishing within Indonesia fisheries management zone. 
We could not prevent them from catching SBT, since SBT is caught as un-
expected by-catch. We also could not blame them or fine them from catching 
SBT, since they are not intending to catch the fish, but other tunas as their 
main livelihood. Moreover, they have been involving in this artisanal tuna long-
line fisheries for some decades.” 
The small-scale tuna fleets involvement was also elaborated in the 2017 Annual Report 
to the Ecologically Related Species Working Group. Even though, it was then explained 
that SBT caught as unintended by-catch for this fleets, thus the allocation of national 
quota did not count to the small-scale tuna fleets. From this point, instead of further 
clarification on whether authorized tuna fleets that have been registered and received 
quota have always been met their quota portion, it seems the assumption on the SBT 
over quota is described as the quota overused by small scale tuna fleets catch SBT. 
As Indonesia authority recognized that the small-scale fishermen involved in CCSBT 
fishery was catching SBT unintentionally and for daily living needs, it can be assumed 
those small-scale fishermen, as individual, do not have historical catch for SBT stocks. 
Since there is no national law regulation as an umbrella to the condition for small scale 
fishermen, therefore, the fishing vessel and the SBT catch of small-scale fishermen can 
be potentially classified as “illegal and unreported fishing”. 
3.2. Unreported Catch  
In order to legally fish for SBT stocks, a fishing vessel must be joined association to gain 
certain SBT quota and must be registered in CCSBT record as a vessel authorized to fish. 
This is clearly mention in Resolution on a CCSBT Record of Vessels Authorized to Fish for 
SBT paragraph 9: “Fishing Vessels not entered into the Record are deemed not to be 
authorized to fish for, retain on board, transship or land SBT regardless of their size”. 
In pursuant to Resolution on Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried Out 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities for Southern Bluefin Tuna, Article 
3 mentioned some categories of evidence that a vessel shall be included in IUU fishing 
activities: 
a. Harvested SBT and were not authorized by a member or CNM to fish for SBT, or; 
b. Did not record and/or report their SBT catches or catch-related data in 
accordance with CCSBT reporting requirements, or made false reports, or; 
 
16 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. (2013). Report of the Twentieth Annual 
Meeting of the Commission.  
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In the context of small-scale tuna fleets catching SBT as non target species, it is essential 
to examine the small-scale fishermen position. First, only individual or company joined 
tuna association that will gain quota to catch SBT. Further, the fishing vessel must be 
registered in the CCSBT record to be authorized to catch SBT. Basically, small scale 
fishermen catch fish for daily living needs. In time they have caught SBT, it may count as 
non-target species (by-catch). Moreover, if refer to by-catch policy, Indonesia have 
issued some relevant policies to protect certain fish species. However, none of the list 
covering tuna or specifically SBT as by-catch. Meaning that every SBT catch from small 
scale fishermen can be assumed illegal fishing as they do not have authorization to do 
so, but the legal basis seems inadequate to trap their catches as by-catch itself. 
Second, the law enforcement provision towards violation conducted by small scale 
fishermen is provided in the Fisheries Act No. 31 of 2004. According to Article 12, it is 
stated that "Every person is prohibited from committing an act that causes pollution 
and/or damage to fish resources and/or the environment in the Indonesian fisheries 
management area”. The consequences of any breach to this provision conducted by 
small scale fishermen are stated in Article 100B of the Fisheries Act Amendment No.45 
of 2009 that the action is considered as criminal act that is punishable by a maximum 
imprisonment of one year or a fine. 
In addition, Article 7(2) of Fisheries Act No 45 of 2009 has underlined that “Every person 
conducting business and/or fishery management activities must comply with the 
provisions concerning type, number, and size of fishing gear; fishing area, route and 
time or season to catch; the operating procedure standard; and fishing boat monitoring 
system. Furthermore, it has added in Article 7(3) that the small-scale fishermen are 
excluded from the obligation to comply with “the fishing boat monitoring system” 
provision. While in contrast, Article 100C emphasized the fine punishment towards any 
small-scale fisherman committing act against the obligation in Article 7(2).  
The law enforcement towards small scale fishermen shall be possibly groundless in 
practical due to an inharmonious between Article 7(3) and 100C. By disregarding small 
scale fishing activities into monitoring requirements, how can the government expect 
such activities to be considered non-compliance. As consequences, catching SBT by 
small scale fishermen seems likely untouchable by law and regulation since there is gap 
still remains regarding by-catch policy and the position of small-scale fisheries within 
regulation. 
In addition, the issue of SBT caught by small-scale fisherman could potentially lead to 
illegal and unreported catch. The catch is illegal due to small-scale fishermen, 
principally, do not have authorization to do so. Indication for unreported catch is 
because there is no obligation for small-scale fishers to make catch report to the 
authority.17 Unclear reporting regime could lead to data uncertainties. This should be a 
concern especially because SBT is managed under international fisheries 
 
 
17  In pursuant to CCSBT Resolution on Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried Out 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities for Southern Bluefin Tuna, Article 3 mentioned 
some categories of evidence that a vessel shall be included in IUU fishing activities. 
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3.3. Tagging Obligation 
Validation of the data collection and monitoring the SBT catches should refer to the 
Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) procedure before port entry. This is obligation to 
all members and cooperating non-members to record all SBT movement through CDS 
procedure. Tagging is one of the critical elements of the CDS report as outlined in the 
Resolution on the Implementation of a CCSBT Catch Documentation Scheme. 
In respect of fisheries data collection in particular SBT fishing, Indonesia have had 
experience with large inaccuracies and non-compliance. The discrepancy of Indonesian 
catches of SBT between the import statistics and the monitoring program results 
appeared significantly.  Based on the data collected, it became apparent that the 
estimates of SBT catches by the Indonesian long-line fleet that were exported to Japan 
were shown to be greater than the catches reflected in the Japanese import statistics.18  
Moreover, it was revealed from the 2019 report of Compliance with CCSBT 
Management Measures, Indonesia has not been tagging all SBT catches at the time kill: 
“At least 606 SBT caught by Indonesia were not tagged at the time of kill, 
and in some cases could not have been tagged for up to 5 to 7 months after 
the time of kill”.  
From these fishery data accuracy issue as outlined earlier; it can be seen the SBT 
catches validation as the last defense before the fish attached to supply chain in the 
land is not transparent. Verification process towards the information collected will 
make the data become more accurate. Therefore, enumerators must be placed in every 
landing site. However, insufficient number of enumerators and many data entry 
operators that lack of technical competence and the archipelagic geography of 
Indonesian will probably make the fisheries data collection process costly. 
Consequently, the fisheries data did not really present the actual condition.  19 
Lack of enforcement actions towards SBT quota distribution will also impact data 
inaccuracy because of unreported fishing practices. The CCSBT report of compliance in 
2019 mentioned the tagging issues to all SBT catches,20 showing that the tuna 
associations were unable to control the number of tags circulated due to members not 
reporting the tag use.21 Lack of monitoring by associations resulted inaccuracy between 
the government and the tuna association. 
  
 
18  Polacheck, T. (2012). Assessment of IUU fishing for southern bluefin tuna. Marine Policy, 36(5), 
1150-1165. 
19 Khan, A. M., Mill, A. C., Gray, T. S., Jiang, M., Arief, H., Brown, A., ... & Polunin, N. V. (2020). 
Reliability of the data on tuna catches obtained from the dockside in Indonesia: A study of stakeholders’ 
perceptions. Marine Policy, 122, 104-242. 
20 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. (2019). Report of the Fourteenth 
Meeting of the Compliance Committee. 
21 Novia Tri Rahmawati. (2014). Pengelolaan Kuota Penangkapan Tuna Sirip Biru Selatan di Indonesia. 
Institut Pertanian Bogor. 50.  
Hasanuddin Law Rev. 7(2): 89-104 
97 
 
4. Legal Factors Affecting Compliance with Quota  
There are two approaches in understanding the theory of compliance, namely the 
instrumental approach and normative approach. These two approaches can be 
considered to explain why States adopt and implement international laws. According to 
the instrumental approach, State’s compliance is determined by self-interest with 
having expectation that the potential gain will be higher than the costs of non-
compliance, regardless the sanctions due to such violation. In respect of high seas 
fisheries, the inherent weakness of this regime can lead certain individuals to calculate 
the cost or benefit analysis that there is more to be gained from fishing beyond national 
area. The absence of the threat of severe and effective sanctions, many individuals to 
avoid compliance behavior.  
Meanwhile, the normative approach argues that State’s nationals will comply if the laws 
are met with fair consideration, appropriate or legitimate. The legitimacy of 
international fisheries law was controversial in the late 1970s when the coastal states 
desired to regulate fisheries resources. That was the time when the introduction of EEZs 
concept emerged thus it made the coastal States gained 90% of the world’s commercial 
fisheries jurisdiction. However, for those States denied this justification, the EEZ 
concept was seen as biased and unjust to the freedom to fish. In this approach, the 
personal perceptions of the fishers of States will influence they compliant behavior with 
international law. From these two approaches, it can be seen that compliance with the 
rules and international obligations in international fisheries is influenced by political will 
and strong commitment of States to employ the effective monitoring and enforcement 
of their vessels participating in international fisheries.22 
 
4.1  The Lacuna in Law towards the Engagement of Small-Scale Fishermen in SBT Fishing 
In respect of Indonesia’s non-compliance on its total allowable catch of SBT has been 
considered due to the small-scale fishermen caught SBT unintentionally. In this 
particular context, CCSBT has issued regulation on Attributable SBT Catch in which the 
participation of small-scale fishermen or artisanal fishing in SBT fisheries should be 
included in mortality counts against national quota of a member State. Failed to include 
the SBT catch resulted from fishing activities, the member is indicated as non-
compliance.  
The CCSBT rules also concern with authorization towards fishing vessel to catch SBT. 
This is clearly mention in Resolution on a CCSBT Record of Vessels Authorized to Fish for 
SBT paragraph 9: “Fishing Vessels not entered into the Record are deemed not to be 
authorized to fish for, retain on board, transship or land SBT regardless of their size”. 
That is to say, member States are expected to adopt into their national law regarding 
any subject matter from fishing activities within its jurisdiction that will contribute to 
the total SBT mortality and criteria to authorize the right to fish.  
 
 
22 Elise Anne Clark. (2011). "Compliance enforcement in regional fisheries management organizations 
to which Australia is a party." PhD diss., University of Tasmania, 38. 
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First and foremost, this study assumed that it is essential to examine the Indonesian law 
concerning the small-scale fishermen position. According to Indonesia national 
regulation there are two criteria to determine the right to fish for SBT. First, only 
individual or company joined tuna association that will gain quota to catch SBT. Further, 
the fishing vessel must be registered in the CCSBT record to be authorized to catch SBT. 
It means that every SBT catch from small-scale fishermen who do not join the tuna 
association and the vessel is not registered, then it can be assumed as illegal catch 
because they do not have authorization to do so. 
Second, regarding mortality counts against SBT quota allocation, this study revealed 
how Indonesian law treats the SBT caught unintentionally by small-scale fishermen. The 
elaboration in Table 2 below demonstrates that the small-scale fishermen are excluded 
from monitoring system and reporting regime in the Fisheries Act. Therefore, the total 
SBT catch from the small-scale fishery is poorly known.  
As shown in the Table 2, it seems none of national law provisions can apply such non-
compliant labelling to small-scale fishermen as the law and regulations have granted the 
privilege to do so.  
 
Table 2. The Regulatory Gaps on Small-Scale Fishers’ Compliance 
Criteria Law Provisions Potentially non-compliance 
Licensing or 
fishing permit 
According to Fisheries Act 2009, small 
fishers are free from fishing license and 
fish carrier license.  
Similar provision is provided by the Law 
No. 23 of 2014 concerning Regional 
Government. 
There will be possibility for 
unregulated fishing practices, illegal 
transshipment at-sea, and the use of 
destructive fishing gear  
 
Fishing area Fisheries Act 2004 has justified small 
fishers free to fish in the whole Fisheries 
Management Area (FMA) in Indonesia 
water. 
The free access to whole area of FMA 
will lead to nomadic fishing location. 
The small fishers can land their catch 
at nearby fishing port or the coast, 
thus there might be possibility for 
unreported fish. 
 
Reporting Catch Small fishers are exempted from 
obligation to install VMS and reporting 
requirement. 
Out of monitoring and the fish catch 
data is uncertain or unreliable, there 
will be potential unreported catch. 
Source: primary source (edited) 
By disregarding small-scale fishing activities into monitoring requirement, the legal basis 
seem inadequate to treat their SBT catches as illegal and unreported. As consequences, 
catching SBT by small-scale fishermen, whether intentionally or not, seems likely 
untouchable by law and regulations since there is a gap still remains regarding the 
absence of law towards the unclear position of small-scale fisheries in SBT fishing.  
Considering the SBT’s over-catch has happened frequently, SBT might have gradually 
changed from by-catch to main target. In order to determine the authorization or the 
right to fish, this thesis strongly recommends the need to create a legal framework that 
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covers small-scale fishermen who caught SBT and how their catch should be legally 
treated  
 
4.2  The Extraterritorial Enforcement does not Reflect in Indonesian Law 
The equality in actions between areas within national jurisdiction and the high seas are 
important in order to achieve the international conservation and management 
measures. Recognizing that all States have the right for their nationals to access fish 
stocks on the high seas, in the same time, the cooperation among States for high seas 
conservation is necessary, then the international law must be a universal legal base for 
all States to adopt to ensure they conduct the effective flag State’s responsibility on the 
high seas area.  
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) issued an agreement with respect to 
duties and responsibilities of the Flag States on the high seas, namely “Agreement to 
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas”. The agreement mainly places concerns on the vessel 
engages in fishing activities in the high seas and underlines the following obligations: 
maintaining a record of authorized vessels; requiring the information on catch and 
fishing operation; the exchange of relevant information with FAO and other 
international agencies; ensuring all fishing vessels fly its flag do not engage in activities 
that will undermine the international of conservation and management measures.  
This agreement gives legitimacy to FAO to serve as a clearinghouse for vessels fishing on 
the high seas. FAO developed the High Seas Vessels Authorization Record (HSVAR), 
which provides all States with the information regarding the record and authorization 
status of the vessels that have authorized by State Parties to fish in the high seas, also 
reveal information about infringements conducted by the respected vessels. By doing 
so, the information provided will influence the flag States, also Port States, to take 
responsible decisions. In addition, FAO only grants access to the database to the Parties 
that have fulfilled the information requirements. Nevertheless, the information 
exchange among States provided by this agreement will be effective depends upon how 
much the agreement’s coverage which Parties have did ratification.  
Until recently, Indonesia is not a Party of this compliance agreement. From all of 
CCSBT’s member States, only Australia and New Zealand have ratified the agreement. 
By being State parties who ratified the agreement, both Australia and New Zealand 
have adopted compliance provisions in their fisheries law that enable the two countries 
to do enforcement towards national fishing vessels and foreign fishing vessels 
participating in SBT fishing in the area beyond national jurisdiction.  
The essence of Indonesia to ratify the compliance agreement is to strengthen the 
commitment in ensuring the sustainable fishing not only within national jurisdiction. By 
doing so, this international agreement will be beneficial for the improvement of 
Indonesia national law on high seas fisheries, including highly migratory fish. There are 
two provisions of the compliance agreement which can be a legal base for national 
fisheries law improvement. First, the provision regarding small-scale fishing vessel that 
cannot be excluded from the effectiveness of international conservation and 
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management measures. Paragraph 1 (b) of Article III of the compliance agreement is 
explained the respected purpose: 
“In the event that a Party has granted an exemption for fishing vessels of less 
than 24 meter in length entitled to fly its flag from the application of other 
provisions of this Agreement, such Party shall nevertheless take effective 
measures in respect of any such fishing vessel that undermines the 
effectiveness of international conservation and management measures. These 
measures shall be such as to ensure that the fishing vessel ceases to engage in 
activities that undermine the effectiveness of the international conservation 
and management measures.”  
The second provision is about the obligation to take enforcement measures and 
sanctions towards the national fishing vessels acted in contravention of the purpose of 
international conservation. This provision will push Indonesia to formulate in national 
legislation concerning types of offences in high seas fisheries, as mentioned in 
paragraph 8 of Article III as follows: 
“Each Party shall take enforcement measures in respect of fishing vessels 
entitled to fly its flag which act in contravention of the provisions of this 
Agreement, including, where appropriate, making the contravention of such 
provisions an offence under national legislation. Sanctions applicable in respect 
of such contraventions shall be of sufficient gravity as to be effective in 
securing compliance with the requirements of this Agreement and to deprive 
offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. Such sanctions 
shall, for serious offences, include refusal, suspension or withdrawal of the 
authorization to fish on the high seas”.  
 
4.3 There is No Effective Sanction Measures towards Non-Compliance with Quota 
The main legal instrument to support enforcement measures in Indonesia’s SBT fishery 
is Law No. 45 of 2009 on the Amendment of Fisheries Act 2004. There are three 
important elements for enforcement measures of these Fisheries Acts, namely license 
permit for fishing; fisheries monitoring vessel; and Fisheries Court. None of these 
provisions are specifically pointed to SBT fishing. The only national policy that includes 
SBT is National Tuna, Skipjack Tuna, and Neritic Tuna Management Plan. However, this 
policy document mainly outlines the management aspect, fish stock production and 
recovery.  
Indonesia needs to provide secondary regulations concerning enforcement that 
incorporated the main legal instrument. As SBT management is under international 
regulation, each minimum requirement of enforcement governed by CCSBT guidelines 
should reflect national law and regulations. Referring to the main problem on over-
catch that Indonesia still facing until now, the adopted enforcement approach should 
be adjusted with national situation and capacity.  
While Indonesia’s quota handled by tuna associations, the legitimacy to monitor 
compliance is different to each other. From interview conducted with authorities from 
the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, it is known the quota allocation and 
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monitoring system are completely dependent on the discretion by the tuna associations 
themselves. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to access the relevant standard or 
guidelines provided by the tuna association or at least, how CCSBT’s regulations have 
been adopted to ensure their members’ compliance. 
It is important to analyze whether the Indonesian Government has implemented such 
effective action against non-compliant vessels that have contributed to the over-quota 
issue.  By reviewing the national law and supporting regulations, the result showed that 
the Government has given legitimation to tuna associations in managing and monitoring 
the quota used by the fishermen who are their association’s members. Thus, the 
practical matter of quota distribution itself is completely under the management of 
tuna associations. In order to track the non-compliance, how the association conducts 
monitoring and sanctioning system towards all registered fishing vessels are essential. 
Apparently, the internal policy of the tuna associations is not easy to publicly accessible. 
Considering the main objective of CCSBT is for the conservation of SBT resources, any 
member States are expected to enforce the compliance in managing catch not exceed 
than the quota allocated. Both of Australia and New Zealand have included over-catch 
action as an offence against law and regulation. This regulation is specified and 
associated with the main Fisheries Act. In their national law, there will be legal 
consequences against over-catch action. 
Indonesia fisheries regulations have not included any provision regarding fish quota or 
fisheries under international arrangement. The range of fishing activities more tend to 
general fish stock. Majority of criminal provisions in the Fisheries Act are mentioned for 
any activity that involves harmful fishing equipment and any violation resulted from 
fishing license fraud. Moreover, the Indonesian Fisheries Act exempted small-scale 
fishers from the obligation to install Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). The monitoring 
system is questionable since the only legal control towards small-scale fishers is through 
their fishing license. 
Since the VMS obligation is not applicable to small-scale fishers in Indonesia practices, 
as well as there is no clear definition on over-catch towards fish quota then it can be 
reckoned the monitoring action is low. Electronic monitoring is usually incorporated 
with at-sea inspection. Furthermore, the effectiveness of increasing penalties would be 
not optimal if there is no improvement in detection or inspection.23 If increasing 
detection is too costly with the vast water area of Indonesia, then the corrective action 
strategy towards non-compliance is possibly implemented through the size of the 
penalty to all parties engaged in fishing activities. There should be a list of categories 
about fishing vessels that always perform compliance, and the list of vessels that 
committed non-compliance. By doing so, incentive and corrective action will be 
properly implemented. To conclude, Indonesia national law and regulation must define 




23 Oyanedel, R., Gelcich, S., & Milner‐Gulland, E. J. (2020). A synthesis of (non‐) compliance theories 
with applications to small‐scale fisheries research and practice. Fish and Fisheries, 21(6), 1120-1134. 
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Relevant information has been obtained through a discussion with Government 
authority in semi-structure interview. It is known then, non-compliance with fishing 
quota during 2011 to 2014 was occurred due to the absence of sanction framework in 
CCSBT with regard to non-compliant member States with national quota allocated. 
Since CCSBT has released the Corrective Actions Policy, Indonesia has adopted the pay 
back scheme towards over-catch. The Government settles this pay back mechanism to 
CCSBT. Moreover, the fact that Indonesia’s non-compliance has been came up for 
several fishing seasons and still occurs up to the current period demonstrates that the 
country does not have an effective legal framework to take action against fishing vessels 
that have contributed to over-quota. The necessary actions should cover either the 
over-catch by vessels of association member or the over-catch done by vessels out of 
the association membership itself. The study suggests for consideration on the criteria 
of offence in SBT fishing regulation, in particular to include the over-catch issue that 
catching SBT exceeds than the quota allocated is considered as an offence. Thus, 
reward and punishment will be applied to vessels which comply and the vessels which 
not comply. Early warning system might be employed to the associations and fishing 
companies in order to avoid over-catch. By doing so, the tuna association and the 
companies who joined membership will consider carefully towards every fishing vessel 




International law instruments for conservation measures will never be worked unless 
the national laws of each member States support to do so. Without adequate law 
enforcement, the quota allocation system does not contribute to SBT sustainability. 
Non-compliance issue in SBT fishing by a member State has proved that CCSBT lacks 
enforcement capability to enforce their conservation measures when it comes to fishing 
practices at the national level of a country. On the other hands, the range of national 
legislations will determine whether the conservation objective is possible to be 
executed. This study has argued that the improvement of national law instruments 
should be focused on how to address the main cause of Indonesia’s non-compliance in 
SBT quota allocation. While there is no such compliance strategy that fits a universal 
solution, the compliance law and regulations must be suitable for the nature and 
characteristic of the non-compliance being addressed. In the context of Indonesia, the 
engagement of small-scale fishers in SBT fishing is a typical condition in which the 
country has been dealing with over-catch problem.  
First point of improvement is the need to link the small-scale fishermen to SBT fishery. It 
is suggested that in order to increase levels of compliance, it needs such greater 
legitimacy, thus, the greater involvement of fishers in the conservation process is 
essential. Second improvement is regarding compliance enforcement and corrective 
actions. The over-catch issue for some fishing seasons has shown the obligation to take 
necessary actions towards national vessels that violated the CCSBT provisions has not 
been implemented due to there is no effective sanction measures by tuna association 
against its fishermen who violated the quota allocation. The third improvement for 
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Indonesia’s law is to extend the extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond the national area 
which is high seas. Indonesia should use the right as a member of CCSBT to ensure 
compliance of conservation measures has always been achieved by other member 
states as well. Finally, the fourth improvement is concerning Indonesian legislation 
should be made to support a fisheries traceability. SBT caught by small-scale fisherman 
could potentially lead to illegal and unreported catch. This situation could impact to 
fisheries data uncertainties. It is important to identify and classify separately between 
the total catch from industry and small-scale fishers. Therefore, there is a need to 
establish a catch reporting mechanism for small-scale fishers. 
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